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Dr. HILMI ULAS 





FAILURE TO PROTECT:  
WHY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL FAIL TO RESPOND  







The international community has time and again committed to never let genocide occur again – 
however, multiple bouts of genocide have occurred since the Holocaust. This, in addition to the 
current quandaries surrounding the Uyghurs of China, points to the fact that the international laws 
and institutions have loopholes that allow for genocides – especially those that enact structural 
and cultural violence without necessarily employing direct violence – to ‘slip through’.  
 
This has been the case in spite of R2P policies being in place. In this paper, I examine the inability 
of international systems to capture ‘cultural genocide’ or intervene in it through a case study of 
Northern Cyprus. This study will shed light on the shortcomings of the system, which may also 
illuminate why the international community is likely to fail to protect the Uyghurs and many others 
in the future – unless the current understandings of and approaches to atrocities change. 
 











 In the academic as well as the policy-making worlds, it is widely recognized that the main, 
most devastating type of conflict for the post-Cold War period up to this day has been intrastate 
conflict. According to Evans, “….the debate about humanitarian intervention has not gone away; 
nor will it go away….” (80). In fact, Evans stresses that intrastate conflict continues to be the norm 
when it comes to “serious violence,” citing that “Of the fifty-six armed conflicts between 1990 and 
2000 identified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as major, ….fifty-
three of them were intrastate” (80).  
 Therefore and unsurprisingly, the current, mainstream paradigm of international action is 
that of humanitarian intervention. While civil wars are the most common type of intrastate 
conflicts, the one which has received the most attention per manifestation has been that of 
genocide. Genocidei is one of the most heinous crimes against humanity, and one which, if 
identified, the international community must intervene into immediately to prevent or stop it. Such 
interventions, in their turn, are justified mainly through the languages of the Genocide Convention 
(1948)ii and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P (2005))iii. This type of intervention attempts to 
address the problem of genocide by relegating state sovereignty to a subservient position to 
human well-being and dignity; in fact, sovereignty appears to impinge upon the latter within this 
framework. The debates on the Genocide Convention and the R2P are plentiful yet not really 
fruitful, as will be argued in the third section. While the main focus of the academia has been to 
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find better definitions and manners of execution for this paradigm (i.e. mostly methodological), 
this paper will diverge from the academic conversation at that point.  
This paper posits that there is a state- and (physical) violence-dependence for qualifying 
what genocide is and for justification of humanitarian intervention under the Convention and the 
R2P. My ultimate research puzzle is as such: can the Convention and R2P provide protection for 
the groups of people who wish to preserve a distinct identity and land from physically nonviolent 
crimes against humanity, especially in the case of a cultural genocide? For the purposes of this 
paper, I will attempt to only partially answer this research puzzle through a case study on the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), utilizing this more specific puzzle: is culture a human 
quality that needs to be preserved, and if so, why is the cultural genocide against the Turkish 
Cypriot population in the TRNC not resulting in international humanitarian actioniv?  
 Cultural Genocide?.... and The Case of the TRNC: 
 Why Is the Concept of Cultural Genocide ‘Useful’?: 
The term cultural genocide is one which was proposed by Raphael Lemkin, who coined the 
term genocide in reaction to the events of the Holocaust and internationally normalized and 
mainstreamed the latter term through extensive lobbying, leading to the Genocide Convention. 
Lemkin wanted to employ a cultural component to genocide and had dubbed this vandalismv, but 
this was removed from the final document. To this day, the definition of cultural genocide and its 
place in the realm of international law or humanitarian intervention remains unclear, which is 
problematic as “The fact that the Genocide Convention does not define cultural genocide is 
fundamental to how some conflicts are engaged and others ignored” (Terrence Lyons, electronic 
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correspondence with the author, 12/01/2011) – if we are to take international law and institutions 
seriously.  
Henceforth, it is not surprising that many scholars and practitioners need more convincing 
as to the usefulness of the term, and as to whether cultures should be preserved through the 
international system. For example, Associate Professor Terrence Lyons has stated that “I need a 
bit more convincing on the usefulness of the concept of cultural genocide, in part because culture 
is constantly changing and fluid. If a culture is lost because so few people participate in the 
activities associated with that culture, is it genocide? ….this freezing (and commodification) of 
culture reinforces the marginalization of [such] peoples” (Electronic correspondence with author, 
12/01/2011). Lyons provides us with legitimate concerns, and if we are to claim that cultural 
genocide is a problem which requires international attention, then we must engage them. 
First and foremost, then, we must begin by attempting to coin what culture is, for the 
concept has become “complex, variable, multivocal, and, above all, contested” (Donnelly 2003:26, 
as quoted in Goodale, 72). According to Pruitt and Kim, “….culture is the set of shared and enduring 
meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups” (56, quoting 
Faure & Rubin 1993) and “….is an important determinant of people’s attitudes, self-construal [sic], 
and behavior…” (56), and both Goodale (69) and Korostelina (40, quoting Hampden-Turner 1997-
2000) add that artifacts/products also constitute part of cultures. Through his use of the term 
vandalism, we can clearly observe that Lemkin was focusing more on the destruction of historically 
and culturally important artifacts of a culture when he coined the term cultural genocide. I believe 
this conception of the term is important, but falls short; it is clear that cultures are bigger than 
their products/artifacts. 
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Avruch (1998, as quoted in Ramsbotham et. al., 309) underlines some inadequacies in the 
treatment of culture within the field of conflict resolution, two of which are of import for our 
purposes: that culture is treated independently from human agency and that it is consistent over 
time. Therefore, artifacts and their destruction, vandalism, can be treated easily as they do 
constitute the part of culture easily accepted in the field. So, where can we locate the human and 
changing aspects of culture? 
Individuals (i.e. humans) come into the culture not only as its subjects but also its qualifiers. 
People are directly affected by their culture; its oppression is detrimental. As underlined above, 
culture is a determinant of individuals’ behaviors and attitudes as well as and more importantly, 
their self-construction; i.e. culture gives individuals a sense of a coherent self – and identityvi. 
Korostelina confirms this when she underlines that “Clearly…types of culture have an impact on 
the process of identity formation” (44). This, coupled with the fact that “Psychological analyses…. 
show that individualism and collectivism are ingrained in the psyches of individuals” (Korostelina, 
42), leads us to deduce that culture is a determinant of both collective and individual identities. 
Studies of identity show that it is central to human cognition of and responses to the environment 
– hence, identity is a basic human need, emphasized by needs theorists under the name of need 
for “Belongingness/Love” (Dugan). Moreover, as Goodale aptly points out (75), it is featured as a 
universal human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’s 22nd article. Summarily, 
culture is a necessity for the human existence (as a need) and dignified life (as a right) of an 
individual. Henceforth, cultural crimes should not be ignored and cultures need be preserved; but 
up to a point. I believe we will be able to better define where this point is through engaging our 
question about the changing nature of cultures. 
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According to Avruch (1998, p. 20, as quoted in Ramsbotham et. al., 309) “….culture is, to 
some extent always situational, flexible, and responsive to the exigencies of the worlds that 
individuals confront,” which is in line with Lyons’s worries in regards to the usefulness of cultural 
genocide as a concept. Indeed, culture and cultural identities are defined and re-defined many 
times over, a process which Tilly dubs as the changing of social boundaries (given cultural identities 
are social ones). However, Tilly identifies five mechanisms of such change: encounter, imposition, 
borrowing, conversation, and incentive shift (136), to which we might add disincentive shiftvii. Out 
of these six mechanisms of change, three are problematic: imposition, borrowing, and disincentive 
shift; they are forceful, destructive, create inequalities, etc. On the one hand, Lyons underlines the 
natural transformation of a culture as its original form probably no longer helps individuals in 
confronting their world. On the other hand, if such changes are enforced in psychologically and 
‘existentially’ torturous and damaging – dare we say, inhuman, – manners, and if this is a calculated 
‘attack’ on the receiving culture, aimed at its elimination and replacement, then I believe the term 
cultural genocide becomes an analytically relevant tool to prevent a physically nonviolent denial 
of needs and rights. 
 The 8 Stages of Genocide of Gregory H. Stanton and The Case of the TRNC: 
The process of answering the research puzzle of this paper involves a case study of a 
conflict in Cyprus. To begin with, we have to underline a certain academic and political framework 
which has traditionally been applied to the analysis of Cyprus, which is immediately invoked 
through terms such as the Cypriot/Cyprus Conflict. Out of the twelve resources on the Cypriot 
Conflict utilized or simply reviewed for this paper, all but one (Hasguler) treats the conflict as being 
strictly between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, which is a view held by aid 
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and conflict resolution agencies, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the USAID. 
Turkey and the Turkish community (dubbed settlers by the Greek Cypriot community) are seen as 
being involved in Cyprus only as a matter of foreign policy. In fact, this approach to international, 
multiparty conflicts through a bi-communal framework is a commonly employed one. This paper 
will posit that there might be a need to revisit this traditionalist, common approach to the Cypriot 
Conflict, and other conflicts of its ilk – which is a proposition supported by Olgun (252, first full 
paragraph). This new approach to the Cypriot Conflict appears to be needed on the grounds of the 
following assumptions: the Turkish Cypriots are being subjected to a form of cultural genocideviii 
by the Turkish government and some Turkish Cypriot elites. This assumption, I must admit, is not 
one which I have independently deduced; in fact, I first heard the allegations of a cultural genocide 
against the Turkish Cypriots in the TRNC, where I was from mid-July to mid-August, 2011. The 
suggestion for a novel approach to the Cypriot Conflict borne from the assumption of cultural 
genocide would be that there are two conflicts in the island: one between the Greek Cypriot 
community and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot communities and another between the Turkish 
Cypriot community and Turkey. This paper will focus on the latter Cypriot conflictix. 
Afore we can proceed to answer our research puzzle, which is that of why does the cultural 
genocide in the TRNC not result in action from international community, we must first adopt a 
framework to assert through a case study whether there, indeed, is an ongoing cultural genocide 
playing out against the Turkish Cypriot community – regardless of whether the international 
community also perceives it as such. For this purpose, we need an objective, generally-applicable 
framework to assess whether the events transpiring in the TRNC constitute an instance of 
genocide or notx. For this purpose, the best framework is provided by Stanton, who calls the said 
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framework The 8 Stages of Genocide. These 8 stages involve: 1) categorization, which distinguishes 
people based on certain criteria; 2) symbolization, through which people are assigned names or 
symbols to demonstrate their membership to the category; 3) dehumanization, where one “One 
group denies the humanity of the other group” (ibid.); 4) organization, where planning for 
genocide is carried out by the State (which might involve empowering non-state actors to carry 
the genocide out for the purposes of denial of state responsibility); 5) polarization, where the 
groups are driven apart; 6) preparation, where people are driven to ghettos and where their 
property is taken away forcefully; 7) extermination, which involves the carrying out of mass killings, 
and 8) denial, where the perpetrators of the genocide cover up the evidence and deny the 
existence of any crime or the responsibility thereof. Our case study of the TRNC will thus involve 
determining whether the case fits this framework, and if so, how far along on the stages the TRNC 
is. 
First and foremost, however, let us commence with some background information. Cyprus 
is a relatively small island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, which is “….about half the size 
of Wales, or seven tenths the size of Connecticut” (Dodd 2001, 2), while being “….30 times the 
size of Malta” (Zeff & Pirro, 386) – the latter being the smallest Mediterranean island. However, 
Cyprus has received size-wise disproportionately huge amounts of attention, as it enjoys a 
strategically important position in the region due to its proximity to maritime gateways as well as 
to Turkey and the Middle East (ibid., 382). This is especially true vis-à-vis Cyprus during the Cold 
War, as its geostrategic importance was accentuated due mainly to “….its proximity to the 
countries of the Baghdad Pact, one of the many US-inspired alliances surrounding the USSR as part 
of Washington’s containment policy” (ibid., 382).  
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Currently, Cyprus is divided, with 37% of its lands under the Turkish control, where Turkish 
Cypriots have declared statehood under the name of the TRNC, which is not recognized by any 
country except Turkey. For a detailed historical review of how the island has come to be divided 
between its two communities (the other being the Greek Cypriots, who control 63% of the island), 
which pays homage to both communities’ interpretations of the conflict, see Dodd 2001, Chapter 
2, pp. 7-24. However, establishing such a history falls outside of the scope of this paper. What is 
important for our current analysis is that, since the partition in 1974, the Turkish Cypriot 
community lives in relative economic, political, and social isolation from the rest of the world, and 
is completely dependent on aid and trade from the Republic of Turkey, so much so that some 
speculate that it is a de facto province (the 82nd, to be precise) of Turkeyxi. Currently, this state of 
affairs is negatively affecting the stability of the tentative peace in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region by pitting the Republic of Cyprus, the EU, and Greece against Turkey (together with all the 
parties’ allies) regarding the search for hydrocarbons, as well. As such, promptly dealing with 
cultural genocide and other situations of negative peace (i.e. cases without overt violence) should 
be some of the more prominent goals of our international community and institutions. 
 Categorization, Symbolization, Polarization, and Dehumanization in the TRNC: 
The categorization and symbolization of the Turkish Cypriot people apparently began 
immediately after 1974, together with the initial wave of Turkish immigrants. According to 
Mehmetcik, “A very considerable problem manifested when the cultural differences became 
apparent. The Turkish villagers hailing from Anatolia and the Turkish Cypriots, whose living styles 
mirrored or approximated that of the British due to the island being under British rule until 1960, 
could not much warm up to one another. Couple with this the many cultural differences from fact 
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that the Cypriots could not speak proper Turkish to the fact that they wore miniskirts, whence 
came the Anatolian villagers’ labeling of ‘gavur’xii, which actually started the distancing of the 
Cypriot and Turkish Turks who came from the same lineage and who shared many similarities” 
(152). Henceforth, we can observe that ethnicity, religionxiii, and language were the categories 
through which the Cypriot Turks were categorized as gavur, and that language, lifestyle, 
observance and knowledge of religious tenets, and looks were used to symbolize their category 
since 1974. The fact that such divisions have persisted until today is clear from Hudaoglu’s article, 
which is a reaction to the declarations that Turkish Cypriots were lacking in spiritual terms, and 
that they were not Turkic enough. One addition to the symbolization of the gavur status of the 
Turkish Cypriots is ‘the red passport’ – passports signifying citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus, 
which is regarded as confirmation of non-Turkic and traitor statuses of the many Turkish Cypriots 
who obtained it.  
The comments left below a news piece on a peaceful-protest-turned-sourxiv drive the point 
home: Turkish Cypriots – although mainly in reaction to those who protest the Turkish policies in 
the TRNC – are collectively labeled, to name a few ‘choice’ ones: gavur bastards, the bastards of 
Grivas (the leader of the Greek junta who initiated the 1974 attempts to annex Cyprus to Greece), 
fosterlingsxv, enemies of Turks, and fungi. We must note, of course, that such discrimination is not 
one sided; Professor Erdal Isik recalls hatred exhibited towards Turks by Turkish Cypriots in the 
post-74 periodxvi, mocking comments of the ‘religiosity’ of Turks run rampantxvii, and the labels of 
gaco and garasakal (blackbeard) – categorizing and discriminating based on physical appearances 
and assumed levels of education – are utilized by Turkish Cypriotsxviii. Moreover, Erhurman and 
Hasguler’s works share a common, underlying theme that, while the preservation of the Turkish 
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Cypriot group identity and culture is a worthy goal, it should not be pursued through othering a 
group of people and discriminating against the said people (especially see Erhurman, 261-291; 
Hasguler, 1-19), which, by deduction, leads to the conclusion that such othering and discrimination 
processes are already in place. Yet, and all in all, while less apparent in the official, statesmen-
level, it is apparent that the four stages of genocide of concern to this sub-section have all taken 
place in the TRNC, albeit penetrating the fabric of Turkish Cypriot life to varying levels of depth 
and strength. 
 Organization and Preparation in the TRNC: 
Under Stanton’s 8-stage-framework, organization and preparation are quite similar; the 
former deals with the gathering of resources to the perpetrators and leading to sub-perpetrators’ 
mobilization, whereas the latter deals with the removal of resources from the populations to be 
subjected to genocide. At this point, we must recognize the fact that, in general, it is commonly 
accepted that states are the main perpetrators behind genocidal attempts. Therefore, these two 
components of Stanton’s framework require us to define: who functions as the state in the TRNC 
and who the perpetrators and sub-perpetrators are for the case of cultural genocide at hand. 
 The Question of Statehood: 
There are three possible candidates when it comes to who functions as the state in 
Northern Cyprus: a) the government of the TRNC, b) the government of the Republic of Cyprus, 
and c) the government of the Republic of Turkey. Initially, the Turkish Cypriot community ran its 
own political administration, separately yet not as an independent state (accepted de juro and de 
facto under the doctrine of necessity under the rules of international lawxix, starting with the 
‘autonomous’ Turkish Cypriot Federate State (TCFS) from mid-1974 to 15th November 1983, when 
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the TRNC was declared as an independent state. It was at this point that the UN called for the 
international community not to recognize this unilaterally declared statexx; likewise, the European 
Union (EU) made similar calls, with the European Court of Justice eventually deciding to ban trade 
of goods with certificates of origin from the TRNC (Ozdeser and Ozyigit, 89). Certainly, the United 
Nations and the European Union as well as most of the international community have, time and 
again – while sometimes declaring their sympathy with the Turkish Cypriots, – qualified both the 
TRNC and the Turkish influence in the North of Cyprus as illegal and condemned both. Eventually, 
during the European Union accession of the Republic of Cyprus, it was affirmed that the 
international community regarded the Republic of Cyprus as the de juro state for the whole island, 
while only qualifying the North of Cyprus as non-government control territories (see Zeff and Pirro, 
Chapter 19). We can therefore observe that the de juro statehood in the Northern Cyprus has 
clearly been allocated to the Republic of Cyprus. However, we can expect that de juro statehood 
would not be sufficient for the organization of genocide and the preparations for this purpose; in 
fact, it would require a de facto statehood in these territories, which the Republic of Cyprus 
apparently lacks (for they do not control the territory). 
Having eliminated Republic of Cyprus from our list of possible perpetrators, we must then 
decide which of our two remaining candidates holds the de facto power of rule in the TRNC. 
According to Lacher and Kaymak, “….the TRNC is a “failing state”; its legitimacy has eroded…. 
[there is] wide-ranging skepticism as to the quality of TRNC’s internal sovereignty” (149). 
Additionally, according to Hakki, the TRNC at best qualifies as a puppet state, one declared by 
another state which holds the former’s lands illegally, under international law’s Stimson Doctrine 
(61). Confirming our previous observations, Hakki underlines that, under law, these puppet states 
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have been historically regarded as void and nonexistent (61). Hakki adds that “The TRNC’s 
economy is absolutely dependent on Turkey, letting alone the fact that it does not have a national 
anthem…. Letting alone the fact that Turkish Liras are used as the monetary units, most of the 
TRNC’s budget is approved in Ankara and only through the money coming [from Ankara] can the 
budget be realized” (64), whereby the Republic of Turkey holds absolute sway over domestic and 
foreign politics of Turkish Cypriots. Coupled with the fact that the continued presence of the 
Turkish Military on the island being an implicit threat to any claims for sovereignty by the TRNC 
(ibid., 61-64), this eliminates the possibility of the government of TRNC as a state. 
According to the international community, that is precisely the meaning of all this; the 
Republic of Turkey is, indeed, the de facto state in the North of Cyprus. On this particular issue, 
the European Court of Human Rights has produced three declarations which speak directly to this 
point, all concerning the human rights case of Loizidou v. Turkeyxxi. Firstly, on the 62nd paragraph 
of their judgment released on 23 March 1995 declares that there is no analytical or empirical need 
to differentiate between the direct actions of the Turkish military and those of the subordinate 
local administration in north Cyprus; that the Republic of Turkey was responsible, de facto, for the 
actions of both. Lastly, in the 56th paragraph on their judgment dated 18 December 1996, ECHR 
declared that “It is not necessary to determine whether….Turkey actually exercises detailed 
control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the ‘TRNC’. It is obvious from the large 
number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that her army exercises effective 
overall control over that part of the island. Such control….entails her responsibility for the policies 
and actions of the ‘TRNC’” (edited from quote in Erhurman, 137; footnote 16). Summarily, the 
ECHR clearly emphasizes the facts that: Turkey is in de facto control of northern Cypriot territories; 
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Turkey is in de facto control of the political administration in the said territories; whereby Turkey 
is, in the eyes of the international community and under international law, responsible for the 
human rights abuses – and, by extension, a genocide entailing either physical or cultural violence 
as they both violate rights. 
Organization and Preparation: 
According to Stanton, organization is the accruement of political resources and the 
resources for violence at, and the monopolization of the said resources by the state, whereas 
preparation comes with the denial and withdrawal of the said resources, along with economic 
ones (esp. land) to the targeted group of people, as well as of drawing up ‘death lists’ – the last of 
which, for the purposes of this paper, we will not look for in the case of Cyprus (as underlined 
above, cultural genocide is bloodless violence)xxii. 
The State, i.e. the Republic of Turkey, indeed monopolizes the resources for violence and 
all possible political resources, including the majority in the TRNC whereby any referendum or 
plebiscite in Northern Cyprus will reflect Turkey’s and not Turkish Cypriots’ point of view, and 
where all elections are likely reflect Turkey’s will, excepting local ones. First and foremost, aside 
from the fact that Turkey has between 30 to 40 thousand active soldiers on the island, another 
commonly known fact is that all armed forces in the TRNC, including the police, report directly to 
the Turkish Armed Forces; i.e. they are neither politically nor socially accountable. This assures 
that Turkey has a monopoly on the resources for violence in the TRNC; in fact, on multiple 
occasions this past year, the armed forces used disproportionate and non-legal violent methods 
on civilians, nonviolent protesters, injuring many and detaining even more without proper 
causexxiii. They also and especially targeted groups which protested Turkish presence on the island 
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during the Turkish P.M., Erdogan’s visitxxiv. I was also a personal witness to the abovementioned 
events. The section on the question of statehood has adequately demonstrated the fact that the 
government of TRNC is but a puppet of the government of the Republic of Turkey. Clearly, the 
organization stage has thoroughly been carried out in Cyprus. 
Turkey’s monopolization of the political resources did not restrict itself to the strictly 
political realm; Turkey forcefully – yet lawfully, through ‘laws’ made for this purpose by the 
government of the TRNCxxv – changed the demographics of north Cyprus to capture the majority 
so that she could assure her will would be done in the TRNC. Many authors mourned the fact that 
reliable information on TRNC’s population was not available. Luckily for this paper, after a five year 
interval from 2006, a TRNC population census was conducted through the government on 
12/04/2011, which is recognized by the United Nationsxxvi. This was a de facto census, as so named 
by the government of TRNC. Interestingly, the numbers provided are as follows: The population 
of TRNC is 294 thousand and 906 peoplexxvii, with substantially more than half declaring Cypriot 
originsxxviii. If these numbers are to be trusted, the Turkish Cypriot population outnumbers the 
Turkish population of the island. However, there is cause for doubt. 
According to many newspaper columnistsxxix, political partiesxxx, and workers’ and 
government employees’ unions and other civil society organizationsxxxixxxii, these numbers were 
heavily deflated. Additional claims state that the census suffered from planned exclusion of 
peoples, including approximately 5,000 houses only in one city. Due to these differing claims and 
a lack of neutral, empirical evidence, we must use deductive reasoning, through which we can 
evaluate the claims of Turkish Cypriots being outnumbered. 
 
66 Macedonian Political Science Journal ePP; December 2020, Vol. 8 
First and foremost, we can observe the number of in-use cars and cell phones in the TRNC. 
To begin with, I was able to obtain the numbers of subscribers to the two largest cellphone service 
providers in the TRNC, Vodafone/Telsimxxxiii and KKTCellxxxiv. By simple addition, we can deduce 
cellphone subscribers number at 616 thousand. Moreover, according to Durduran, the number of 
cars in the North is 225 thousandxxxv. From these numbers, we can deduce a total population of 
more than 500 thousand, of which upwards of 300 thousand can be estimated to be Turkish 
nationals, two thirds of whom would be undocumentedxxxvi. Henceforth, while not conclusive due 
to a lack of concrete evidence, we can claim with confidence that Turkish nationals most probably 
outnumber Cypriot nationals in the TRNC. Given that democracy is defined in the most limited 
manner worldwide as majority rules, this follows that Turkish people and thus Turkey de facto 
rules in the sociopolitical landscape of the TRNC. Also, this demonstrates that the Republic of 
Turkey has systematically withdrawn and re-allocated the Turkish Cypriot territory over to the 
Turkish immigrants. 
 Execution and Denial in the TRNC? 
While similarities between conventional and cultural genocide were meaningful in the 
treatise of the past six stages – allowing for comparisons, – we must necessarily expect 
divergences from the conventional norms in the execution and denial of the cultural genocide. 
One of these divergences comes from the bloodless nature of cultural genocide, whereby the 
method of execution and the nature of evidence to be covered (mass graves) naturally would not 
be common with cultural genocide. I believe the latter form of genocide, unlike with the 
conventional genocides which have swift yet wide execution, comes through with long-lasting 
policies aimed at gradually, yet forcefully eliminating the indigenous culture of a territory, reducing 
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the number of people subscribing to the target culture over time (forced displacement; incentives 
to leave and disincentives to stay, forced assimilation etc.) and decreasing the numerical 
concentration of people subscribing to the target culture over time (through forced minoritization, 
which occurs when a nation exports its citizens to territories she has conquered to the point where 
the demographics of the said territories are altered). It must be noted that the third method, which 
is utilized by Turkey in the TRNC, is strictly against the Geneva Convention of 1949xxxvii. All in all, I 
propose that this slow genocide would emulate a natural transformation of a culture through 
contact and conversation (two other identity transformation mechanisms à la Tilly (136)), as even 
the people on the ground might not become aware of the cultural genocide they are being 
subjected to until it is too late. 
This appears to be the case when it comes to the TRNC. According to Inatci, the Turkish 
Cypriots’ current uprising against Turkish policies in the TRNC territory, which constitute a last-
ditch effort for self-preservation in response to what he dubs the cultural colonialism by Turkey 
(45), “….demonstrates the politicization of the knowledge that [the Turkish Cypriots] are losing 
numbers” (41). In the meantime, Turkey downplays the demographic changes it has enacted (as 
can be seen in the recent census conducted in the TRNC), while also denying its responsibility in 
the TRNC, claiming that the TRNC is an independent state with its own local administration. The 
cultural changes, in the meantime, are regarded as nonexistent, as “….those who come are Turks 
and those who go are Turks” (ibid., 45). Henceforth, we can clearly observe that the 6 ex-facto 
stages of genocide have already taken place in the TRNC, and the facto and post-facto stages of 
genocide constitute an ongoing phenomenon. 
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To conclude, I will let Inatci answer for us the question of whether a cultural genocide is 
taking place against the Turkish Cypriot community or not: “A certain group of people…. wants to 
resist this movement for cultural and demographic oppression which aims for the destruction of 
the Cypriot population and the Cypriot identity. No country can internalize an immigration 
exceeding its own population…. The othering technique of decreasing the social boundaries of a 
group so much that its members aspire for another identity is one endemic to cultural colonialism” 
(46). No matter what we label it, there appears to be indeed a cultural genocide taking place in 
the TRNC. Now to our overarching research question: why does this fact not result in international 
action? 
 Humanitarian Intervention, The ‘Ignored’ Focus of the Debates: 
Murder is unique in that… it is the one crime in which society has a direct interest. 
~ W. H. Auden 
 
The concept of prevention of genocide through humanitarian intervention was first 
conceived as a reaction to the events of the Holocaust as well as a retroactive ‘protection’ of 
Armenians and Christians against the atrocities committed by the Ottoman Empire at the time 
(Chalk, 150). The two main international declarations which prompted humanitarian intervention 
against the crime of genocide have been the Genocide Convention and the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P)xxxviii. Both of these treaties come with considerable shortcomings. On that note, the 
R2P was developed as a better, alternative principle due to the failure of the Genocide 
Convention to spur the international community to prevent the crime of genocide. Indeed, the 
R2P increases the scope of the Convention to allow for all crimes of humanity to be responded to 
with the severity of genocide and clarifies the subservient nature of the nation-state vis-à-vis its 
people. The debates on the Convention and the R2P follow a similar pattern; according to Evans, 
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“the [academic scrutiny] has been very comprehensive, addressing not just the legal and moral 
dilemmas that have been at the heart of most of the academic and policy debate about coercive 
intervention so far but operational and political issues as well” (80). Summarily, the academic 
debates have problematized the methodological aspects of the R2P and the Convention (and the 
articles I have reviewed on this topic mirror this trend), due mainly to the fact that “Much has 
been written about genocide…. Little has been done to prevent it” (Chalk, 152). Other aspects 
which have been more than adequately scrutinized are the problems of definition of groups and 
definition of what constitutes genocide. While worthy debates, none of these arguments will be 
engaged for the purposes of this paper; the former because the purpose of this paper is not to 
offer alternative methodologies, and the latter two because they do not directly relate to our 
puzzle at handxxxix. 
 Our research puzzle is much more specific than why does R2P not translate into more 
and/or faster international action; our research puzzle wonders why the TRNC and cultural 
genocide are overlooked within the Convention-R2P frameworks. This is not a puzzle which 
problematizes the methodological aspect of humanitarian intervention; in fact, it is one which 
problematizes the ontological aspects of it. There is reason to believe that these ontological 
shortcomings might be the cause of the aforementioned methodological frustrations; for if the 
ontology, i.e. our knowledge, is not complete, can our actions – based on the said knowledge – 
realistically be expected to produce the desired results? Given this, I will briefly discuss three of 
the most pertinent shortcomings, vis-à-vis the TRNC, in the norms of humanitarian intervention 
which I have observed: a) state-dependence; b) violence-dependence; and c) assumption of self-
execution of interventions by neutral parties. 
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 State-dependence is a common symptom of anything international, as the international 
community and the international order both treat states as central and ever-present; the 
international order chiefly does not deal with individuals but states (see Russett and Starr Chapter 
3; especially look at 70). Henceforth, it is not surprising that international interventions, such as 
humanitarian ones, depend on states on many levels: the states need to be the perpetrator; the 
state is the one to be negotiated with; etc. In the case of the TRNC, where there is only 
circumstantial and certainly interpretive evidence as to who the state is, the Convention and R2P 
fail to make tails and heads of the situation. Moreover and more tragically, the victims of cultural 
genocide, due to the lack of a legitimate state, cannot make their voices heard in the international 
community – for only a state’s voice is heard at that level. Erhurman underlines this point strongly 
when he writes: “The states which are influential in international organizations and international 
politics never problematized the happenings in North Cyprus. According to them,….it was 
impossible to discuss or do something concerning the relationship between the State in North 
Cyprus and its citizens proved impossible in the face of the U.N.S.C.’s resolutions” and that “….the 
international community was worried that attempts at interventions into the human rights abuses 
in North Cyprus would be perceived as the recognition of the state there” (206). This is not unique 
to the TRNC; Somaliland, Taiwan, and Nagorno-Karabakh are just some of the other cases where 
avoidance of implied recognition trumps humanitarian, justice, etc. concerns of the international 
community. 
 Humanitarian intervention, which is a tool to prevent violence, exhibits high levels of 
violence-dependence; i.e. humanitarian intervention is only really carried out when high levels of 
physical violence takes place, such as in the case of Rwanda, Libya, and Sudan. The Genocide 
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Convention relegates the crime of genocide to one which is strictly physical by the non-inclusion 
of a cultural and/or environmental component. The R2P, while calling for ensuring the provision 
of human needs and rights, disallows humanitarian intervention in the absence of high levels of 
violence, for it underlines confrontational approaches only as a last resort, hence forcing the 
international community to negotiate with the State first. Henceforth, it is not surprising that the 
international community would fail to take action in the case of the cultural genocide of Turkish 
Cypriot peoples, for – while some police brutality takes place – there is simply not enough violence 
to shock and awe the international community, and neither to beget action. While UNESCO and 
other international bodies attempt to preserve cultural artifacts, they – being non-military and 
non-forceful sources of power – fail to meet the standards of necessary conditions to protect 
‘culture’ against organized and violent agents. 
 Perhaps the most destructive ontological problem of the Convention and R2P frameworks, 
however, is the naïve expectation that the documents will be self-executing, where neutral third-
parties to the conflict will intervene out of a sense of community and responsibility. This problem 
is ultimately what makes Hannum dub R2P as pastiche rather than paradigm (135), for the R2P . 
Indeed, the international community has lately intervened into Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, citing 
human rights abuses, preservation of life, respect for democratic will, etc., which appears to 
support the frameworks’ expectations of actions on shared responsibility (Yanacopulos and 
Hanlon, 66). However, the key here is the case of Burma, where the international community 
refused to invoke the R2P principle for an intervention, “….arguing that Burma did not pose a 
threat to international peace and security in the region, and that the internal affairs of the state 
did not have a place within the Security Council.”xl Henceforth, it is apparent that realpolitik affects 
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the carrying out of humanitarian interventions, which is not surprising, for such interventions 
come with high economic and time costs, wherefore (especially in an economic crisis, as we 
currently are) such funds must be strategically located. Given this, it is illogical to problematize the 
use of humanitarian language as justification for pursuing interests (see Yanacopulos and Hanlon, 
63).  
As mentioned in our case study, Cyprus is strategically important; however, Turkey is even 
more so, given its rising influence in the turbulent Middle-East region and its serving as a stable 
bridge between natural gas and Europe. Interventions against Turkey might lead to a war unless 
handled extremely carefully. Even if not, is it not rationally fair to say that the sacrifice of the 
culture of around one to two hundred thousand people is an acceptable price to pay to ensure 
regional stability in the Middle-East? Hence, it is clear that, through a realpolitik sense, ignorance 
vis-à-vis the TRNC is bliss. Lastly, as the stronger groups make better allies and yet as the strong 
tend to be the oppressors of another’s culture, the realpolitik norms of the international realm will 
probably not ever allow interventions based on cultural preservation. 
 Conclusions: A Bleak Vision of the Future 
The infectiousness of crime is like that of the plague. 
~ Napoleon Bonaparte 
Throughout this paper, we have asserted that culture is a need and a right for all humans 
and human groups, and that a cultural genocide is being committed against the Turkish Cypriot 
people in the North of Cyprus. However, we have also observed that, even with the declaration of 
the International Responsibility to Protect principles, the problems of nonviolent crimes, such as 
cultural genocide, are beyond the ‘sensor range’ of the international system’s radars and will not 
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be recognized, let alone dealt with. We have also underlined the unfruitfulness of assuming that 
humanitarian interventions will be carried out simply because they are internationally-shared 
responsibilities.  
The ontological loopholes in the rigid framework of the international community cause a 
failure to adapt to the evolving nature of mass atrocities. Historically, genocidal crimes – one the 
plagues of mankind – have evolved from mass killings to politicizes/mass oppression of will based 
on the reactions from the international community; and currently, we are observing yet another 
evolution of the crime into cultural genocide by the way of forceful minoritization and forced 
assimilation, etc., and we can expect that the international order and community will (time and 
again) fail to prevent or deal with such atrocities for the foreseeable future. The case of the TRNC 
has demonstrated that people without a properly representative/internationally unrecognized 
state will not be able to reach out to the international community, as it currently is, if ever 
victimized. Nonviolent crimes simply cannot be stopped under the current international regime; 
i.e. the concept of humanitarian interventions is ill-fitting to the international realm. The statues 
of Budha in Bamiyan in the hands of Taliban only garnered soft responses. Meanwhile, many 
churches and mosques were regularly destroyed during the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia – again, 
with nary an international response or acknowledgment. These facts alarm us as to the eventual 
fate of the Uyghur Turks of China, the South Ossetians, and the Palestinians, to name a few.  
To conclude, the international system is one which is based on liberal principles such as 
the R2P, but governed by realpolitik concerns – and international inaction and cognitive blindness 
is a result of this dissonance. Nonviolent crimes, as things stand, are more than likely to go 
unpunished, especially where the target group does not have considerable voice in the 
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international community through a state, wherefore it is only natural that the cultural genocide of 
the Turkish Cypriot community does not result in international action. Their culture will probably 
wither away, and this will transform the Cypriot Conflict as a whole – unless the international 
community can rediscover the political will it lost in Somalia, for R2P, while well-meant, is an 
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iv I would like to acknowledge Professor Terrence Lyons’s contributions in defining this research puzzle.  
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Chapter 2.  
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‘no gain vs. severe losses’ calculations. 
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ix Needless to say, the paper might touch upon prospects on the Republic of Cyprus vs. TRNC and Republic of Turkey conflict, as considerations to 
one variable in this equation can be safely assumed to have some effect on the other.  
x
 While the events might constitute crimes against humanity, which is an accusation just as weighty as that of genocide, our research puzzle 
requires us to look specifically for ‘traces’ of genocide. 
xiFor example, see: http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/51000/PageName/KIBRIS_HABERLERI - commentary posts by 
usernames Ufuk and Kemal (dated 04/07/2011) and Ufuk (dated 04/08/2011). 
xii A term which refers to those without religion or those who are non-Muslim, usually employed in the description of the Greek Cypriot and Greek 
peoples. 
xiii
 On this point, see also: http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/116799/PageName/Ic_Haberler 
xiv
 See: http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/51000/PageName/KIBRIS_HABERLERI 
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 This I can attest to from personal experience. As my father is from Turkey, and I feel half-Turkish, I always felt the need to correct my friends 
and classmates whenever such demeaning labels were utilized in my presence, which was quite frequently.  
xix
 See Ozersay’s work. 
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